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During its 2019/2020 term as a member of the UN Security Council, 
Germany aims to generate impetus for disarmament and arms control. 
A particular challenge in this regard is presented by North Korea’s develop-
ment of its nuclear and missile arsenals. In 2017, Kim Jong Un and Donald 
Trump escalated the conflict surrounding this issue. Then in 2018, summit 
meetings between Washington and Pyongyang and between the two Koreas 
opened up the possibility of future cooperation. However, the US and North 
Korean positions on denuclearisation remain far apart.
 • The summits in 2018 led to a decrease in tensions. Diplomacy, rather than the 
threatening gestures of 2017, was the focus. This was a significant step forward.
 • North Korea halted its nuclear and missile tests, and the USA suspended its 
military exercises with South Korea. However, North Korea does not want to 
comply with the demand for rapid and complete denuclearisation.
 • Without substantial advances regarding the nuclear question, the sanctions on 
North Korea will remain in place. The opportunities for inter-Korean coopera-
tion will also remain limited.
 • The summit agreement between Kim and Trump from June 2018 and the sec-
ond summit planned for the end of February 2019 offer a chance to achieve 
normal bilateral relations, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the 
curbing of the nuclear threat in the medium term.
 • It would now make sense to agree on clear interim steps related to stopping the 
production of nuclear fissile material and its use in weapons technology, and 
the dismantling of the North Korean missile arsenal. In return, suitable cor-
responding steps should be offered. 
Policy Implications
The complete dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal should remain the 
goal, but is unrealistic in the short term. The German government should use 
its seat on the UN Security Council to push for pragmatic interim steps, as these 
offer the best chance of increasing security in Korea and the region. In line with 
German priorities, the focus should now be on effective disarmament and arms-
control measures. 
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The Escalation and De-Escalation of the North Korea Conflict
After Kim Jong Un took power at the end of 2011, North Korea massively expanded 
its missile testing. In 2017 it also tested three long-range intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICbMs). The latter increased the direct threat to the United States – and eu-
rope. This was accompanied by intensified nuclear weapons tests, which culminated 
in the testing of a hydrogen bomb in 2017. These events confirmed the warnings of 
departing US president obama to his successor, Donald Trump, that North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile programme represented the most dangerous threat to the USA.
In 2017, Kim and Trump systematically escalated the conflict regarding North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal. Threats and insults were exchanged. Trump 
stressed that because of North Korea’s provocations, all options, including mili-
tary ones, would be considered. In August 2017 he threatened Kim with “fire and 
fury like the world has never seen.” North Korea responded by threatening to fire 
missiles at the US military base in Guam. This did not, however, take place; North 
Korea appears to have shied away from further escalating the spiral of conflict given 
the threats coming from Washington. While the leadership in Pyongyang had con-
sciously presented itself as unpredictable in the past, it was now confronted with 
the same unpredictability – feigned or not – on Washington’s side. based on this 
new dynamic, an armed conflict no longer appeared impossible. South Korea, which 
would be among the main victims of such a conflict, was able only to watch the dan-
gerous spectacle from the sidelines.
For this reason, South Korean president Moon Jae-in gladly took up a diplomatic 
offer made by Kim at the beginning of 2018. The crisis year 2017 was followed in 2018 
by the year of summit diplomacy. This Focus first examines what was and was not 
achieved via this summit diplomacy. It then addresses how to move forward – taking 
the second summit between Trump and Kim into account. It recommends a process 
that entails concrete disarmament and arms-control measures in return for steps in 
the direction of diplomatic relations between the USA and North Korea, for a peace 
regime, and ultimately for the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
What Was and Was Not Achieved in 2018
In his 2018 New year’s address, Kim Jong Un explained that North Korea had “per-
fected” its nuclear forces. It thus possessed a “powerful deterrent” against the USA 
and could now proceed to the mass production of nuclear warheads and missiles. 
At the same time, he offered his country’s participation in the Winter Olympics in 
South Korean Pyeongchang and called for the reduction of military tensions and the 
improvement of relations. This overture was immediately taken up by the govern-
ment in Seoul. The subsequent working meetings led to an extremely dense course 
of summit diplomacy regarding the Korean Peninsula which included no fewer than 
three summit meetings between the leaders of the two Koreas. There had previously 
only ever been two summit meetings, in 2000 and 2007. In addition, Kim travelled 
to China for the first time in March 2018 to confer with President Xi Jinping; three 
further summits followed in the period up to January 2019. However, the indisput-
able highlight of “summit year” 2018 was the first meeting between the political 
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leaders of the USA and North Korea, which brought Trump and Kim together in 
Singapore on 12 June 2018.
As richard Feinberg and Stephen Haggard (2018) argue, “summitry” could 
gain in importance in view of the Trump government’s questioning of multilateral 
institutions. Summit meetings are not (only) about negotiations and agreements, 
but can also fulfil other functions: networks can be developed; particular norms and 
values can be strengthened; the degree of room to manoeuvre can be tested; initia-
tives can be started; and last but not least, signals of political leadership that are 
also intended for a domestic audience can be transmitted. The increased density of 
many summit meetings also means it can no longer be assumed that all such meet-
ings are prepared well in advance and result in carefully formulated agreements.
For example, the numerous summits regarding the Korean Peninsula in 2018 
also served, not least, to create the appropriate mood between the participants or to 
maintain momentum. Accordingly, summit meetings do not always have to be the 
end result of lengthy low-level negotiations but can also initiate or facilitate them. 
The 2018 summit with Kim Jong Un was also a litmus test for Trump’s highly person-
alised, ad hoc, and transaction-oriented approach to diplomacy. For Trump it was 
ultimately about understanding how Kim “ticks” and whether a “deal” is possible.
What were the key outcomes of summit year 2018, and above all the Trump-
Kim summit? Even before the first summit meeting with Moon, Kim announced that 
in view of the successes achieved to date, all testing of nuclear weapons and ICbMs 
would be halted and the nuclear test site Pyunggye-ri, where all previous tests had 
taken place, would be shut down. The tunnels were in fact exploded (which also 
made a detailed assessment of North Korea’s atomic testing activities significantly 
more difficult) in May 2018, in front of the assembled press; experts were not pre-
sent. For his part, Trump announced directly after the summit meeting with Kim 
that he would put the “very expensive” and “very provocative” joint military exer-
cises with South Korea, which take place each year in various forms, on hold for the 
duration of the talks with North Korea. To date, both sides have maintained these 
promises. In effect, this meant the de facto application of the “Freeze for Freeze” 
proposal (a moratorium on nuclear and ICbM tests in exchange for the suspension 
of military exercises) brought forward by China and Russia but still firmly rejected 
by the US government in spring 2018 (Klingner 2018: 7).
The Results of the Singapore Summit
The actual, brief, and in places vague statement published after the summit in Sin-
gapore covered four points. Both sides agreed, first, to reconfigure their bilateral 
relations and, second, to “join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace re-
gime on the Korean Peninsula.” North Korea committed, third, to work towards the 
“complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (BBC 2018). And fourth, both 
sides committed to recovering the remains of US soldiers killed or missing in action 
in the Korean War (1950–1953) and to the immediate repatriation of those already 
identified (BBC 2018). 
For Kim even the summit meeting itself – where he was on equal footing with 
the US president – was already a major success, which could be used to obtain le-
gitimacy in the eyes of his own population. but Trump was also clearly interested in 
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the summit in order to present himself as a problem solver. Following the summit 
he declared grandiosely that the nuclear threat from North Korea no longer existed 
and that complete denuclearisation was already underway. In the USA and europe, 
however, the outcome of the summit was received with disappointment, or at least 
very cautiously. The final declaration did not go beyond the agreements made in 
the past, and partly fell short of them. It remained unclear how things would pro-
ceed in concrete terms. The demand for the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
de nuclear isation” of North Korea, which had in previous years been repeated in 
mantra-like fashion by the USA – and had been incorporated in UN resolutions – 
was also not reflected in the statement. Following the summit, US foreign minister 
Pompeo spoke of a “final, fully verified denuclearization” (Klingner 2018: 12); this 
term was not more specifically defined, but suggested a certain flexibility.
Despite its brevity, a number of things about the declaration from Singapore 
are remarkable. First, the question of denuclearisation was connected to the im-
provement of bilateral relations and the creation of a permanent peace regime on 
the Korean Peninsula, and can thus no longer be addressed independently. It is 
also noteworthy that the order of the first three points more strongly reflects North 
Korea’s priorities. The reconfiguration of bilateral relations comes first, then the 
peace regime, and only in third place the issue of denuclearisation. That the discus-
sion here refers to the denuclearisation of the “Korean Peninsula” and not of “North 
Korea” also reflects a long-standing North Korean position. Finally, the fourth point 
appears to be a tribute by Trump to veterans’ and surviving relatives’ associations 
in the USA. In fact, the recovery and repatriation of remains already took place be-
tween 1996 and 2005 (Haggard 2018).
Ultimately, neither side was able to achieve its main goal in Singapore; no con-
crete measures towards rapid denuclearisation were agreed, and no sanctions were 
lifted. What actually happened is that “the can just got kicked a bit further down the 
road,” as they say in the USA. Although a real breakthrough most certainly looks 
different, it can be said that the summit has launched a new process of dialogue 
and negotiation. Singapore will remain an important point of reference, and Trump 
risked a great deal with this unconventional summit, which his critics view as hav-
ing valorised the North Korean regime. Whether the summit will one day be viewed 
as the starting point for a genuine transformation of the conflict on the Korean Pen-
insula or as the beginning of the dissolution of the US-centred security architecture 
in Northeast Asia remains to be seen.
Inter-Korean Summit Diplomacy
In any case, one positive development that resulted from events in 2018 is that 
South Korea can again play an active role in processes dealing with North Korea and 
is no longer condemned to an observer role. At the three inter-Korean summit meet-
ings in 2018, steps were made to reduce tensions and build trust. In addition, the 
two Koreas laid the foundations for the resumption and development of econom-
ic and infrastructure cooperation. For example, a joint military commission with 
permanent communication channels was created. In the demilitarised zone, mines 
were cleared and watchtowers were torn down. Additionally, there were new visits 
between separated families and there are plans to open a permanent meeting place 
   5    GIGA FoCUS | ASIA | No. 2 | FebrUAry 2019 
in the Kumgang Mountains. At the September summit, North Korea also reaffirmed 
that it wanted to dismantle its missile-testing site in Tongchang-ri (also known as 
the Sohae Sattelite Launching Station) and promised to shut down the yongbyon 
nuclear facility in return for “corresponding measures” on the part of the USA.
With a view to the future linking of the rail lines on the west and east coasts of 
the peninsula, the relevant lines on the North Korean side were surveyed in summer 
and fall 2018. A symbolic linking ceremony took place in December 2018. Addition-
ally, both Koreas are considering the reopening of the Kumgang tourism complex 
and the Kaesong industrial park, which were closed in 2008 and 2016 as a result 
of tensions. The creation of a joint economic zone on the west coast and a tourism 
zone on the east coast have also been discussed. An application to jointly host the 
Summer olympics in 2032 is also planned.
Given the existing UN sanctions, the extent to which these plans are realised 
depends not least on the progress regarding denuclearisation. To better coordinate 
each of their dialogue processes with North Korea, the USA and South Korea estab-
lished a joint working group in october 2018. The new US representative for North 
Korea, Stephen biegun, is leading the US side. In 2018, the two dialogue processes 
at times appeared to be only loosely connected; in view of Trump’s volatility and 
South Korea’s sandwich position between the USA and North Korea, this is not 
surprising.
As an interim conclusion, the following can be said: In 2018, diplomacy was 
given a chance again, representing a step forward following the dangerous escala-
tion. The various summit meetings made it possible to reduce tensions, build trust, 
and lay the foundations for negotiations and cooperation. The halting of nuclear 
tests, the closing of the test tunnels, and the testing moratorium for ICbMs are im-
portant and useful first steps as part of a denuclearisation process. The acute threat 
to the USA has declined.
Nevertheless, all the steps taken in 2018 are reversible. In addition, the North 
Korean nuclear and missile programme continues to exist and has – aside from 
tests – possibly been further developed in the meantime. on the other hand, despite 
the demand made in fall 2018 by North Korea, China, and russia that they be re-
laxed, the comprehensive sanctions on North Korea are still in place. These consist 
of collective UN sanctions; various direct bilateral sanctions; and so-called second-
ary sanctions implemented by the USA, which are pursued on an ongoing basis and 
which target actors in third countries doing business with North Korea (cf. Haggard 
2019). everything else now depends on the advances made towards the establish-
ment of new relations between the USA and North Korea, towards a permanent 
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and towards the denuclearisation of North 
Korea. The negotiations between the USA and North Korea on these issues did not 
stall in the second part of 2018, as has been rumoured here and there; rather, they 
haven’t seriously begun. The second Kim-Trump summit planned for the end of 
February 2019 could serve as the starting point for concrete negotiations.
The Way Forward: Arms Control instead of Maximum Demands
According to pessimistic estimates, not much can be expected of future negotia-
tions between the USA and North Korea. North Korea, it is argued, will never give 
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up its nuclear weapons and missile programmes. The country’s leadership views 
these as a survival guarantee (partly given the experiences of Iraq and especially 
Libya), as an effective deterrent to the USA, and as an important source of domestic 
legitimacy. North Korea’s status as a nuclear power is now written into the country’s 
constitution and the statutes of the Worker’s Party of North Korea. The various at-
tempts at denuclearisation, whether bilaterally between the USA and North Korea 
or as part of the Six-Party Talks (2003–2009), have not been successful. North 
Korea has broken its word on several occasions and was only prepared to re-enter 
talks because of the USA’s military threats and the united front between China and 
the USA regarding the implementation of UN sanctions. Its primary goal here was 
to drive a wedge between the sanction-sending countries and to receive concessions 
in return for empty promises (see e.g. Klingner 2018; Lankov 2018).
on the other hand, it can be argued that based on the Agreed Framework of 
1994 it was quite possible to freeze the production of weapons-grade plutonium for 
roughly eight years and thus to prevent North Korea from building numerous nu-
clear weapons. This agreement ultimately failed, something that both North Korea 
and the USA contributed to. but it was useful to at least slow the development of 
weapons technology. North Korea is of course far more advanced in nuclear terms 
today than it was then. This does not automatically mean, however, that agreements 
are no longer possible. It just makes these agreements more complex.
Warnings from other perspectives are also being made against new negotiations 
with North Korea that lead to give and take – that is, to reciprocity. The moralistic 
argument raised here and there is that one should not negotiate with a totalitarian 
regime under which human lives are not valued, political freedoms do not exist, and 
civil rights are trampled on. only a strategy of maximum pressure, with the end of 
the regime as its goal, is appropriate in dealing with North Korea. The argument 
that bilateral or plurilateral agreements with North Korea could undermine the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty and encourage copycats is also principle-based, but 
oriented towards the application of global norms and rules. From this perspective 
as well, the only possible reaction to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons 
and delivery systems is a strategy of maximum pressure that uses sanctions. The 
lifting of these sanctions and additional offers of economic and other cooperation 
are only possible if North Korea renounces its nuclear arsenal and completely and 
verifiably gives it up. Finally, in Japan in particular there are fears that a potential 
bilateral agreement between the USA and North Korea could come at the expense 
of third parties – for example, when agreements are made about ICbMs, but other 
systems that threaten the countries in the region are excluded.
All these perspectives and the accompanying arguments and interests need to 
be taken seriously, but they do not necessarily have to be shared (completely). In 
any event, they do not address the condemnation-worthy but very real existence of 
the North Korean nuclear and missile programmes. If these are not monitored, con-
tained, and limited in terms of future development, the security risks – including the 
danger that know-how and hardware are passed on – will increase within the region 
and beyond. North Korea does not want to and will not relinquish nuclear weap-
ons in the foreseeable future. This position is partly based on the country’s threat 
perceptions, which have been shaped by historical experiences. The robustness of 
the mutual assistance pact with the People’s republic of China, North Korea’s only 
remaining ally, is also questionable. In addition, the rapid and complete renuncia-
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tion of nuclear weapons would be difficult to sell domestically, to the military and 
to the population. Such a step would be a complete contradiction of the strategy to 
date, which is seen as successful from the North Korean point of view and on which 
the current leadership’s legitimacy is based. On the other hand, a sufficient degree 
of economic development, as put forward by Kim Jong Un in his byungjin strategy 
(nuclear armament and economic development), can only be achieved if the multi-
lateral sanctions are lifted, or at least relaxed. Against this backdrop, it is important 
to seriously determine what steps the North Korean leadership is prepared to take 
and what can be offered in return.
one goal of these steps and the counter-steps must be the transformation of 
the anachronistic and long-outdated 1953 Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty. 
A peace treaty should be linked to the gradual establishment of normal relations 
between the USA and North Korea. To this end, diplomatic missions should first be 
set up in both capital cities. Also necessary is a clear and equally gradual process of 
denuclearisation, disarmament, and arms control, with the possible end point being 
a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula. These processes, which would result in 
a web of treaties with different partners depending on the issue, can only be success-
fully pursued when the actors involved, initially the USA and North Korea, abandon 
maximum expectations and initiate effective disarmament and arms-control meas-
ures. Concrete interim steps that address all three parts of the North Korean nu-
clear programme – the production of nuclear fissile materials, their use in weapons 
technology, and the delivery systems – could themselves lead to increased security.
Recommendations for Concrete (Interim) Steps
In recent months, experts and diplomats such as robert einhorn (Hankyoreh 2018), 
Siegfried Hecker (2018), Mintaro oba (2018), and Philip Zelikow (2018) have made 
sensible recommendations for relevant (interim) steps. Zelikow has correctly ar-
gued that a rigid focus on denuclearisation is the wrong strategy. A lack of progress 
on denuclearisation has in the past repeatedly led to the breakdown of negotiations 
and relations. The pattern was usually as follows: In return for short-term counter-
measures, North Korea gave up parts of its nuclear programme that it didn’t need 
(any more), or pretended to do so. This led to dissatisfaction among the other actors 
and further worsened the situation. Additionally, purely nuclear-focused diplomacy 
excludes South Korea. For this reason, argues Zelikow, it is important to use numer-
ous negotiation tracks to create an environment in which the North Korean leader-
ship has to make difficult decisions regarding the country’s development.
A declaration that hostilities on the peninsula are over and that it is time for a 
lasting peace could represent the beginning of a multi-track process with different 
formats and participating actors. Such a declaration would, for example, be possible at 
the second Trump-Kim summit. Track one, with the two Koreas at the centre, could, 
according to Zelikow, be dedicated to the future configuration of inter-Korean rela-
tions (peace treaty, border, confederation, unification). Track Two, which could in-
clude the members of the UN Security Council, would deal with economic questions 
and the future of sanctions. Their relaxation would have to be linked to progress in 
the area of nuclear security (including ICbMs), which would be discussed within 
Track Three. Track Four would address general security questions. Alongside mili-
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tary trust-building, these would include the size and deployment of conventional 
armed forces on the peninsula (including short-range missiles). A possible example 
might be the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in europe (see also Kling-
ner 2018: 19). North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons arsenal could also 
be addressed as part of this track. Track Five could deal with humanitarian and 
cultural questions, including the human rights situation in North Korea and miss-
ing Japanese citizens. A sixth track, which could be used in the event of adequate 
progress in the other tracks, would deal with regional security questions and could 
follow up on the Six-Party Talks.
regardless of whether a negotiation process takes place along precisely these 
tracks, what is important is that it is multidimensional and links the complexes of 
peace regime, USA–North Korea relations, disarmament, arms control, and denu-
clearisation – understood as a process – with one another. Depending on the topic, 
South Korea, China, russia, and the other members of the UN Security Council, in-
cluding Germany, should be included alongside the USA and North Korea. only then 
will the effective implementation of the resulting agreements be possible – including 
the option of a return to the strategy of maximum pressure in the event of failure.
The precondition for negotiations should not be the complete disclosure of all 
North Korea’s nuclear activities, missile arsenals, and related facilities. This would 
hardly be technically feasible and would also be unacceptable to the North Korean 
side as it would signal its unconditional surrender and simultaneously present the 
US military with a list of targets. Instead, the disclosure and subsequent control 
measures could focus on the area being addressed in a concrete step of the process. 
For example, separate disclosures and controls are conceivable for (a) nuclear fis-
sile material and the halting of its production, (b) the gradual reduction and hand-
ing over of nuclear warheads, and (c) the limitation and ultimate relinquishing of 
missile systems. With regard to fissile material, the focus is on plutonium, enriched 
uranium – in yongbyon and likely elsewhere – and forms of heavy hydrogen (for 
more detail see Hankyoreh 2018; Hecker 2018). 
A gradual process of denuclearisation and arms control that initially focuses on 
slowing and limiting North Korea’s arsenals and capabilities will not satisfy maxi-
malists, but it can limit the dangers of unbridled nuclear and missile armament 
(including proliferation). The question of where the fissile material will ultimately 
be stored will also have to be addressed at some point. The German government 
should work to convince the UN Security Council that arms control is more realistic 
than rapid disarmament. As oba (2018) also argues, there is currently no better 
alternative, but there are many worse ones. Nor does such a process appear to be 
doomed to failure from the start, because North Korea does not actually need un-
limited nuclear weapons and missile systems to view its security as guaranteed. Ne-
gotiations should thus be used to determine which nuclear and other disarmament 
and arms-control steps are possible – in return for the equally gradual relaxation 
of sanctions, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and North 
Korea, a peace treaty, and other measures. With regard to the relaxation of sanc-
tions, it makes sense to distinguish between bilateral sanctions imposed by the USA 
and multilateral sanctions. In terms of the latter, flexible inter-Korean cooperation 
projects could be possible initially if appropriate progress is made (see e.g. Haggard 
2019; Hankyoreh 2018).
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Many observers, in the USA and elsewhere, believe that there should be no 
negotiations with North Korea, or that such negotiations cannot be successful. It 
is time, however, to determine whether North Korea is prepared to take significant 
disarmament steps in order to advance the country’s economic development. The 
second summit between Trump and Kim at the end of February 2019 in Vietnam 
could serve as the starting point for negotiations in various formats. As part of its 
membership in the UN Security Council in 2019/2020, the German government 
should support a gradual process of nuclear and conventional disarmament and 
arms control on the Korean Peninsula. Drawing on its own strengths, the German 
side could, where required, offer technical, infrastructural, and other assistance in 
implementing such agreements.
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